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Non-state, network-based threats are elusive and effective. There is an ongoing 
discussion about how the U.S. government can best counter these threats. What is lacking 
in this discussion is a clear understanding and general agreement concerning what these 
threats are capable of. The potential of these networks should be the primary driver of 
these discussions. Currently there is a split among researchers concerning the potential of 
network-based actors. The source of this division is a debate about whether and to what 
extent decentralized network-based actors can conduct strategic planning. This thesis 
contributes to the debate through qualitative analysis of two non-state, network-based 
actors, to show the capacity to plan strategically, evidenced by their ability to acquire and 
employ agents of influence. 
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Non-state, network-based threats are elusive and effective.1 Because of this, there 
is an ongoing discussion about how the U.S. government can best counter these threats. 
What is lacking in this discussion is a clear understanding and general agreement 
concerning what these threats are capable of. The potential of these networks should be 
the primary driver of these discussions. Currently there is a split among researchers 
concerning the potential of network-based actors. The heart of this division is a debate 
about whether network-based actors can conduct strategic planning. This thesis 
contributes to the debate through qualitative analysis, of non-state, network-based threats, 
to identify evidence of strategic planning capacities.  
To accomplish this, research focused on proving, or disproving, that network-
based actors can employ agents of influence; an act that requires a strategic planning 
capacity. The employment of agents of influence was chosen as a test because it requires 
a relatively low level of financial overhead to execute. Use of these agents does not 
require wildly expensive technology, nor does it require a massive volume of personnel 
to fill multi-tiered staffs. For this study, using agents of influence as an indicator of a 
strategic planning capability proved to be appropriate, working as an equalizer and 
creating a space where network-based actors might be able to compete with states.  
A. AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 
Mao-Zedong, in his On Guerrilla Warfare, likens the population (of the state) to a 
body of water, and the guerrilla to the fish that swim in it.2 To expand on this metaphor, 
the agent of influence is the current, guiding the direction and character of the water.  
                                                 
1 The term “network” is used in different ways. For this this thesis the term refers to decentralized, 
informal organizations over formal, centralized and bureaucratic organizations. For further discussion on 
this see Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 6.  
2 Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC: 
United States Marine Corps, 1989), 92–92. 
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Agents of influence are a subversive threat that can have long-lasting effects on 
the targeted state. Marked by their status and position, they have the ability to bring about 
change. These agents may come from a wide cross-section of society and fill roles such 
as social leaders, religious figures or politicians. Most importantly they have an audience 
that is valuable to the subversive actor. The agent of influence becomes a conduit for the 
subversive actor, providing a platform to stream narratives, information, and ideas with 
the intent to influence the actions of the targeted audience.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW OF WESTERN THOUGHT ON NETWORKS 
This literature review gives insight as to how the thesis question was developed. 
This is done by broadly examining the evolution of western thought concerning 
networks, arriving at the current debate, about whether or not network-based actors can 
conduct strategic planning.  
Western thought on networks largely stems from business and industry. In 1961 
George Stalker and Tom Burns, who are renowned for their impact on organization 
theory, compared and contrasted an organic managerial system and mechanist managerial 
system, and identified them as poles in a spectrum of managerial approaches.3 This idea 
of two poles, with centralized control or hierarchy at one end and decentralized control or 
network at the other, remains a useful heuristic today. Stalker and Burns demonstrated 
that authority within a network is determined by consensus. Whoever is most 
knowledgeable on an issue becomes the authority.4 This reduces the time it takes to make 
and implement a decision, which makes networks able to deal with change faster than a 
hierarchy.5 The ability to do this is dependent on all the individuals within the network 
working under shared principles or beliefs.6 This sets the basis for the idea that networks 
have the advantage of speed and adaptability. Ideas can be realized and quickly 
implemented. However, this system has a weakness: bad ideas can also be implemented 
                                                 
3 Tom Burns and George Macpherson Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock 





quickly.7 These ideas are consistent with thoughts on networks today but they are very 
basic and do not account for how individual relations make up the network or how the 
network interacts with other networks.  
The interaction of networks is addressed by Mark Granovetter, a Professor of 
Economic Sociology at Stanford University, in his article “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 
where he explains that information travels further and to a larger audience when passed 
between persons who have weak ties versus strong ties.8 This happens because people 
who have strong ties with one another are similar, they share similar opinions and spend 
considerable time together; therefore, thoughts among a tight group are circular. But, 
when a person in a tight group has a weak tie with a person from another tight group, new 
ideas can stream between the two, creating a bridge.9 Groups of strong bonds or nodes 
are connected with other nodes through weak ties creating a large network.  
The overall network and its components can take many forms, primarily defined 
by the types of ties and forms of control exerted within. In “The Advent of Netwar” a 
RAND publication prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt identify three primary forms of networks: the all channel, star, and 
chain.10 The all channel network allows for communication between all members. The 
star requires information to be sent to one focal point before being distributed out to the 
other members. The chain is a series of nodes that communicate in sequence; information 
is passed through the chain from one node to the next.11 These different shapes provide 
advantages ranging from increased capability to increased security. The size of a network 
is also a factor. Network size is limited by the carrying capacity, or number of ties that 
                                                 
7 David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 4. 
8 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1363, doi:10.1086/225469. 
9 Ibid. 
10 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 49. 
11 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 49. 
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can be maintained.12 Because of this, networks can reach a point where they become 
closed.13  
Up until this point there has been wide agreement about network compositions, 
basic advantages and basic disadvantages but, there are differences in thought about what 
networks are capable of, especially concerning threat networks. One end of the spectrum 
is the concept of swarming. This is when a series of nodes can converge on a target at the 
same time.14 Swarming is made possible by the speed at which networks can exchange 
information and adapt. The opposite end of the spectrum suggests that networks have a 
limit. Tucker states that because networks are transitory or shifting, they do not have the 
ability to conduct strategic planning.15 This idea suggests that networks cannot hold a 
long-term course to produce political change. This coincides with the idea that networks, 
without centralized control, run the risk of individual nodes making decisions that are 
detrimental to the networks overall goals.16 At the heart of these two arguments is the 
disagreement over the advantage networks enjoy from speed of information and 
adaptability with the tradeoff of control. One idea that deals with the tradeoff of control is 
that threat networks can morph. Depending on needs, goals and outside stimuli, networks 
and nodes can slide between centralized control and decentralized control. Sean Everton 
and Daniel Cunningham draw on social network analysis in order to show that dark 
networks become centralized just prior to an attack in order to effectively mobilize 
resources, and then become more decentralized after an attack to increase adaptability.17 
                                                 
12 Gautam Ahuja, Giuseppe Soda, and Akbar Zaheer, “The Genesis and Dynamics of Organizational 
Networks,” Organization Science 23, no. 2 (2012): 435, doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0695. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David F. Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, 
Netwar, and Information - Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
1999), 53–55, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR989.htmldb=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=20493. 
15 David Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 53. 
16 W. Enders and P. Jindapon, “Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (2009): 263–264, doi:10.1177/0022002709355439. 
17 Sean F. Everton and Daniel Cunningham “Dark Network Resilience in a Hostile Environment: 
Optimizing Centralization and Density,” Criminology, Criminal Justice Law, and Society 16, no. 1 (2015): 
1–20, https://scholasticahq.com/criminology-criminal-justice-law-society/. 
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This ability to fluctuate does explain how networks can exert control but it only addresses 
short term control. 
Information technologies have had a profound impact on society and in turn 
networks. Manuel Castells, a Spanish Sociologist and Holberg Prize recipient, in The 
Rise of the Network Society calls attention to paradox that occurs with the increase of 
information technology, as the world becomes more networked the drive for 
individualization increases and society becomes powerless in controlling its destiny.18 
This sparks images of individuals acting completely unbound searching for meaning, 
with the sum of their actions in mas constantly redefining society. Castell also describes 
another effect of information technology and that is the complete isolation of individuals, 
groups and entire countries that cannot keep up with these information systems.19 Both of 
these ideas suggest that networks can have unplanned strategic effects. 
By striking the correct balances between external ties and close ties, capability 
and security, centralized control and decentralized control, is a network truly capable of 
employing agents of influence? According to Tucker’s theory that networks lack the 
ability to plan strategically the answer is no. These operations are long-term in nature and 
require considerable strategic planning. But, if the overarching ideology is unifying 
enough then that may be all that is needed. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The overarching question that this thesis seeks to answer is; can non-state, 
network-based actors plan strategically? To scope this broad question, the research 
focused on determining if these actors can employ agents of influence. This yielded the 
following question: can non-state, network-based actors employ agents of influence? 
To answer these questions, qualitative analysis was conducted in two areas, the 
employment of agents of influence by states and by non-state network-based actors. 
Analysis of state employment of agents of influence demonstrates the necessary strategic 
                                                 
18 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 5. 
19 Ibid., 2. 
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planning capacity to employ them and specific characteristics which are indicative of 
such agents. These characteristics are then used to identify and qualify employment of 
agents of influence by network-based actors.  
 
D. ORGANIZATION  
The body of this thesis is organized into three major chapters: “Agents of 
Influence,” “Hamas Employment of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development as an Agent of Influence,” and “Al-Qaeda Employment of the Al-Kifah 
Refugee Center as an Agent of Influence.” Each of these chapters presents relevant 
background information followed by a qualitative analysis. 
Chapter II presents two cases of states employing agents of influence, Pierre-
Charles Pathé, an individual agent of influence and the Trust, an organization that acted 
as an agent of influence. This chapter demonstrates that the employment of agents of 
influence requires a strategic planning capacity and identifies specific characteristics of 
agents of influence.  
Chapters III presents the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development as a 
Hamas agent of influence. Chapter IV presents the Al-Kifah Refugee Center as an Al-
Qaeda agent of influence. Chapter V summarizes findings and presents areas for further 
research. The result is a contribution to academic debate, which argues that non-state, 
network-based actors can have a strategic planning capacity.  
E. CASE STUDY SELECTION AND PROCESS 
This thesis required case studies to serve as a baseline and case studies to test 
against the baseline. The result is two baseline case studies that demonstrate states 
employing agents of influence and two test cases that demonstrate networks employing 
agents of influence.  
 7
1. Selection of Baseline Case Studies: Pierre-Charles Pathé and the 
Trust 
To select the baseline cases, Pierre-Charles Pathé and the Trust, the author 
searched for instances of states employing individuals and organizations to influence 
target populations. The resulting pool was narrowed by looking for cases in which the 
states concealed their involvement.  
Several case studies initially appeared to meet these criteria but upon further 
research did not. Two strong candidates that fell into this category are Radio Free Europe 
and the World Council of Peace. Both of these cases are examples of organizations 
sponsored by states to influence target audiences. Because the involvement of the 
sponsoring states, not just the sponsoring intelligence agencies, were not concealed they 
were not appropriate. Rather, they are better used as examples of propaganda, on par with 
the Kremlin-sponsored news organization Russia Today.  
2. Selection of Test Case Studies 
Selection of the test case studies relied on two main criteria. The sponsor or 
employer must be a non-state, network-based actor and the agent must qualify as an agent 
of influence by demonstrating the characteristics presented in Chapter II. This resulted in 
two cases, Hamas employment of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
and Al-Qaeda employment of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center.  
Selection of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) as a 
case study started as research focused on Hamas’ use of charities and charitable 
organizations to obtain support. Several organizations surfaced as candidates for this case 
study such as, the Muslim American Youth Academy (MAYA), United Association for 
Studies & Research (UASR,) and Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP.) All of these 
organizations showed strong potential to be case studies, but were not pursued because 
there was more factual information about the HLF. This large volume of information is a 
result of an extensive Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation and the court 
case US v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et al., which made the 
FBI’s information accessible.  
 8
Selection of Al-Kifah as the second network-based test case relied on the same 
criteria as mentioned earlier, but followed a different methodology. Research started by 
focusing on the actions of Ayman Zawahiri. Zawahiri, during his initial years in Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), showed a propensity for recruiting agents into clandestine 
relationships. Zawahiri used these agents to obtain information or materials and not to 
influence a population. Selection methodology then shifted and focused on significant 
influential Al-Qaeda affiliates. Two individuals surfaced as good candidates for further 
study, Anwar al-Awlaki and Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Anwar al-Awlaki proved to be 
unsuitable because there is no strong evidence of a clandestine relationship between him 
and al-Qaeda. Further research of Sheikh Rahman led to his involvement with the Al-





II. STATE EMPLOYMENT OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 
The devil’s finest trick is to persuade you that he does not exist. 
―Charles Baudelaire20 
 




This chapter provides examples of two different types of agents of influence and 
how they were employed in an effort to achieve a strategic goal. The first example is 
Pierre-Charles Pathé, an individual whom the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB) employed as an agent of influence to subvert France, the United 
States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO.) The second is the 
Trust, an organization developed by the Russian Bolsheviks in the 1920s to subvert 
external and internal threats. These two examples serve to enhance the understanding of 
agents of influence.  
A. PIERRE-CHARLES PATHÉ: AN INDIVIDUAL AGENT OF INFLUENCE 
Following WWII and during the Cold War, the Soviet Union pursued the goal of 
spreading communism throughout the world. The Soviets considered alliances such as 
NATO a direct threat to this goal. One Soviet strategy to remove or minimize this threat 
was the KGB’s employment of Active Measures. Active Measures refers to Soviet and 
Soviet Bloc operations designed to influence the U.S. and other NATO governments. 
During the height of the Cold War, it is estimated the Kremlin dedicated $3 billion to $4 
                                                 
20 Charles Baudelaire and Louise Varèse, Paris Spleen, 1869 (New York: New Directions Pub. Corp., 
1970), 61. 
21 Elbert Hubbard, Little Journeys to the Homes of Great Teachers (New York: Roycrofters, 1908), 
23. 
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billion a year to these efforts.22 According to Ladislav Bittman, a former Deputy 
Commander of the Department of Active Measures, the Soviet Union viewed the United 
States as its main enemy and sought to split U.S. alliances. The following is a partial list 
of Active Measure goals provided by Bittman: 
 Turning world public opinion against U.S. foreign policy; 
 Creating favorable conditions for Soviet foreign policy by confusing the 
world public about the real nature of certain Soviet policies; 
 Isolating the United States from its allies and friends in Western Europe 
by creating new rifts or exploiting current differences; 
 Paralyzing NATO from within by convincing NATO countries that U.S 
military strategy is against their national interest23 
The KGB used covert and overt means to accomplish these goals. The use of 
agents of influence accounted for one of several Active Measures methods. 
Pierre-Charles Pathé acted as an agent of influence, working under KGB control 
for two decades to subvert the French government. At the height of his career as a KGB 
agent of influence, Pathé regularly streamed soviet propaganda and disinformation to the 
French elite through credible publications. The themes stressed in his writings were 
aligned with the overarching Active Measures guidance, as provided by Bittman. The 
exact effect of Pathé’s influence is difficult to determine because he was but one of 
several hundred Soviet influence operations. However, it is significant that during his 
time as a KGB agent France underwent a nationalist movement and withdrew its military 
support from NATO.  
1. Background: Pierre-Charles Pathé 
Pierre-Charles Pathé enjoyed a high social status as a member of French elite 
society. He was the son of a prominent film maker, brother in-law to a minister, a French 
                                                 
22 G. McK. Kinahan, “Exposing Soviet Active Measures in the 1980s: A Model for the Bush 
Administration?.” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 15, no. 3 (1990): 314, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1303764316?accountid=12702. 
23 Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (Washington. DC: 
Pergamon-Brassey, 1985), 46. 
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ambassador to the United States, and the president of the Renault auto firm.24 Pathé also 
wrote political thought pieces for multiple French media outlets. Pathé’s status gave him a 
unique audience that proved valuable to the KGB. In 1959, Pathé attracted the attention of 
the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, or Resident, by publishing a pro-Soviet essay titled “Essai 
sur le phénomène soviétique” (Essays Concerning the Soviet Phenomenon.)25 The Resident 
cultivated a relationship with Pathé that eventually led to his recruitment by the KGB.  
In 1961, with the support of the KGB, Pathé created a news outlet titled, Center 
d’Information Scientifique, Economique et Politique (Center of Information for Science, 
Politics and Economics), codenamed OBZOR. Through the news outlet the KGB sought 
to weaken Franco-American relations, strengthen Franco-Russian relations, and influence 
France to move away from NATO.26 This operation lasted for six years and ceased 
operations soon after the French military withdrawal from NATO. 
Pathé continued to work with the KGB. In 1976 they started a bi-weekly 
publication titled Synthesis, codenamed CACTUS.27 This publication marked the peak of 
Pathé’s career as a KGB agent of influence, and lasted until his capture by French 
counter-intelligence in 1979. At its height, Synthesis possessed a list of subscribers 
comprising 139 senators, 299 deputies, 41 journalists, and 14 ambassadors.28 The KGB, 
through Pathé, captured 47 percent of the French senate and 70 percent of the chamber of 
deputies,29 as a direct audience for its propaganda and disinformation. Synthesis focused 
on fostering mistrust between NATO allies, by criticizing American economic policies 
towards Europe and defending Soviet foreign policy.30  
                                                 
24 Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, 
DC: PergAman-Brassey,1984), 135. 
25 Christopher M. Andrew, and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive 
and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 464. 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid., 471. 
28 Richard Shultz, Roy Godson. Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington. 




Pathé continued to act as an agent of influence for the KGB until his capture in 
1979. Pathé’s downfall started with his handler Igor Aleksandrovich Sakharovsky, who 
became a person of interest to the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the 
French counter intelligence. In 1978 Sakharovsky reported to his superiors that he 
suspected he was under surveillance, and he suspended meetings with Pathé for several 
months.31 The meetings resumed in 1979, on 5 July of that year the DST caught Pathé 
and Sakharovsky together. The DST observed the two men meeting and exchanging 
envelopes containing documents and money. Pathé made a full confession and French 
courts sentenced him to five years in prison, of which he only served one year due to 
humanitarian concerns for his old age.32  
2. Analysis 
The case of Pierre-Charles Pathé serves as an example of an individual agent of 
influence. It demonstrates the strategic planning capacity necessary to employ such an 
agent, requiring close alignment of the agent’s actions with the employing entities 
strategic objectives. The case also highlights specific characteristics of agents of 
influence which are: their actions are aligned with the sponsor’s objectives, they are 
employed through a clandestine relationship, and they target a population to influence on 
behalf of the sponsor. 
a. Strategic Alignment of Pathé’s Synthesis with Soviet Active Measures  
Themes in Synthesis aligned with the Active Measures objectives described by 
Bittman. The publication focused on fostering mistrust between NATO allies, criticizing 
American economic policies towards Europe and defending Soviet foreign policy.33 
According to Shultz, in his book Dezinformatsia which includes the most in-depth 
analysis of Synthesis to date, Synthesis had two general themes “denigration of, and 
                                                 
31 Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive 
and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 471. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Richard H. Shultz, and Roy Godson. Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey, 1984),139-149. 
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attacks on, Western interests and policies; and the defense of the USSR and its allies.”34 
These two themes were aligned with several Active Measures objectives. The denigration 
of and attacks on Western interests attempted to turn world public opinion against U.S. 
foreign policy, isolate the United States from its allies, and paralyze NATO by casting 
doubt on U.S. military strategies. By defending the USSR and its allies, Synthesis sought 
to create favorable conditions for Soviet foreign policy. Collectively, the journal articles 
painted a picture of doom for France if it remained aligned with the United States and 
Western Europe, while it down played any Soviet threat.  
b. Clandestine Relationship 
The KGB maintained a clandestine relationship with Pierre-Charles Pathé through 
a series of KGB handlers, starting with the Soviet Resident in Paris and ending with KGB 
officer Igor Aleksandrovich Sakharovsky. The nature of this relationship not only served 
to protect Pathé from French authorities but it also preserved Pathé’s credibility. The 
KGB relied heavily on this credibility to stream themes, through Pathé, to French 
decision makers. This resulted in the appearance of a talented darling of the French elite, 
producing original thoughts and ideas for political consumption, void of any direct soviet 
influence. 
c. Influence 
The KGB used Pathé in an effort to influence French decision makers. This is 
evidenced by the fact that over 47 percent of the French senate and 70 percent of the 
chamber of deputies subscribed to Pathé and the KGB’s joint publication Synthesis.35 Of 
significant note, almost no private citizens subscribed to Synthesis. Clearly the KGB 
primarily targeted French government officials.  
Prior to Synthesis, at the behest of the KGB, Pathé created and ran the news outlet 
titled Center d’Information Scientifique, Economique et Politique. Through this outlet the 
KGB sough to influence French academics and thinkers. The news outlet produced 
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essays with the purpose of encouraging strong Franco-Russian ties and weakening both 
Franco-American ties and French ties with rest of Europe.  
B. THE TRUST: AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE IN THE FORM OF AN 
ORGANIZATION 
Entire organizations can be used as agents of influence to the same effect as 
individuals. An actor can infiltrate or create a new organization to influence target 
populations. Within the organizational agent of influence, there is likely a mixture of 
persons who are aware and unaware of the true subversive nature of the organization. 
This mixture can make the organization even more effective and the hand of the sponsor 
harder to detect. To effectively direct an organization to act as an agent of influence, a 
carefully planned strategy with clear objectives is necessary. The result is an organization 
working to influence target populations to the benefit of the sponsor. The development 
and employment of the Trust by the Bolsheviks demonstrates this. Through the Trust the 
Bolsheviks conducted multiple concurrent operations, including the employment of 
additional front organizations. This study is not focused on a full history of the Trust. 
Instead, this example illuminates the actions the Trust took against one anti-Bolshevik 
group known as the Combat Organization to demonstrate how an organization can be 
employed as an agent of influence. 
1. Background: The Trust 
The Trust, a front organization developed at the behest of Lenin, subverted the 
efforts of anti-Bolshevik Russian émigrés and Western intelligence agencies in order to 
protect the Bolshevik Commissar party. The Trust effectively exposed key members of 
the anti-Bolshevik movements, stymied their efforts, and served as a platform to spread 
disinformation. The overarching theme for the disinformation stated that the use of force 
and terrorist actions against the Bolshevik party was unnecessary because the Bolsheviks 
were being supplanted by individuals who held anti-Bolshevik ideals; thus, Russia was 
on a path to peacefully rejoin the community of nations. This allowed the Bolshevik party 
to effectively define and dispose of a latent threat over the course of six years. 
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a. Identifying a Need 
In the 1920s, Lenin became increasingly concerned about a counter-revolutionary 
threat posed by groups of anti-Bolsheviks, known as White Russians, living abroad and 
in Russia.36 The White Russians who lived outside of Russia were known as émigrés, 
who fled predominantly to Western countries after the Bolshevik take over. Émigré 
numbers were estimated to be between one million and two million.37 Some prominent 
émigrés formed fledgling anti-Bolshevik groups and had aspirations of returning to 
Russia to overthrow the Bolsheviks. The internal White Russians, known as Monarchists 
who belonged to the Monarchist Association of Central Russia (MOTSR), were fairly 
isolated to Moscow and Petrograd and had little to no communication with the external 
groups. These organizations did not pose an immediate threat, however; Lenin believed 
that if the policies of the countries hosting the émigrés changed the internal and external 
White Russians could come together and mount a counter-revolution. This created a 
vulnerability that Lenin did not accept. On 1 December 1920, Lenin ordered the Cheka, 
the term for the first Bolshevik intelligence and security apparatus, to develop a way to 
neutralize the émigré threat.38 Felix Dzerzhinsky, chief of the Cheka, directly presided 
over this operation. 
b. The Trust Is Born 
The fledgling MOTSR served as the foundation to be penetrated for the 
development of the Trust. Once the Cheka penetrated the MOTSR the terms Trust and 
MOTSR became synonymous. Prior to December 1920 Dzerzhinsky reported on the 
MOTSR’s anti-Bolshevik activity. His command directed him not to destroy it; instead, 
he was to leave it in place and find a way to infiltrate and control it.39 The opportunity to 
infiltrate the MOTSR came in the form of an unfortunate Alexander Yakushev, a Russian 
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citizen, member of the MOTSR, and a high ranking employee of the Ministry of 
Waterways.  
In November of 1921, Yakushev, while traveling on official business to Norway 
or Switzerland, stopped in Tallin Estonia to meet with Yuri Artomonov, a former Czarist 
Officer.40 The exact reason for the visit is unknown; what is known is the dialogue that 
transpired which made Yakushev vulnerable to coercive manipulation by the Cheka. 
During their meeting Yakushev explained  
that although he was serving the Bolshevik regime, he was opposed to it 
and that, in this, he was by no means alone. He said that many ex-Tsarist 
officials and officers remained strongly anti-Bolshevik at heart. So heavily 
were the government and the Red Army infiltrated by this element that the 
Bolshevik regime itself was undergoing a subtle change.41 
Artomonov then relayed this message to the Monarchist Council in Berlin. The 
Cheka, by an unknown means, intercepted the message and ascertained Yakushev’s 
connection to the Monarchists.  
Dzerzhinsky staged an opportunity to confront and force Yakushev to turn on the 
MOTSR and work for the Cheka. Dzerzhinsky arranged for the Ministry of Waterways to 
send Yakushev on a business trip to Irkutsk. While traveling Yakushev was apprehended 
by two Cheka officers and diverted to Lubyanka for three weeks of interrogation. The 
Cheka provided a story to cover for Yakushev’s absence, which stated that he had fallen 
ill with typhoid.42 During interrogation Yakushev divulged all he knew about the 
MOTSR and his involvement. To his surprise, instead of being executed for treason, the 
Cheka sent him back to Moscow with instructions to assume his normal routine and 
report on further MOTSR activities. Eventually Dzerzhinsky recruited Yakushev into the 
Cheka. 
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During Yakushev’s interrogation a concurrent Cheka operation laid the ground-
work to build the Trust. The Cheka sent an agent, under the cover that he was a 
messenger for Yakushev, to meet with Artomonov. This agent vaguely outlined the 
structure of the MOTSR and emphasized the high level role that Yakushev held in it. The 
agent directed Artomonov that all MOTSR activity outside of Russia would be referred to 
as the Trust, under the pretense of a business organization. He also provided him with a 
detailed plan to communicate with the MOTSR leadership that included codes and a 
point of contact to serve as a go between. By doing this the Cheka established the 
framework for its penetration of the anti-Bolshevik Émigré. 
This framework alone may have been sufficient to gain intelligence on the 
MOTSR and émigrés but Dzerzhinsky was much more ambitious, he wanted to take full 
control of the MOTSR and use it to subvert the émigrés. To do this the Cheka carefully 
directed Yakushev’s activities to elevate his status with key émigré leaders. They also 
continued to penetrate the MOTSR leadership by turning individuals or planting Cheka 
agents and officers in the MOTSR. Eventually all the top leadership of the MOTSR fell 
under Dzerzhinsky’s control and the anti-Bolsheviks held Yakushev in high regard as 
trusted member with means and connections. 
c. Neutralizing the Threat 
Through the Trust the Cheka identified the structure and character of multiple 
émigré groups and their relationships with one another. The three primary groups were 
the Monarchists (traditionalist that desired a return to czarist style rule), The Peoples 
Association for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom lead by Boris Savinkov (an 
anti-Bolshevik and anti-Tsarist democratic leaning group), and the Eurasians. The Cheka 
developed and employed unique methods to counter the efforts of each of these 
organizations. They ranged from disseminating disinformation aimed at miss leading 
groups to targeting individuals to be captured or killed. 
The Cheka identified a split amongst prominent émigré Monarchists. A 
disagreement about whether or not to use force within Russia to subvert Bolshevik rule 
caused the split. General Petr Nikolayevich Baron Wrangle, a talented officer with 
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political acumen, advocated for building a network of white Russians in Europe and 
“waiting-to-see” what happens.43 General Kutepov, Wrangle’s former subordinate, 
advocated for terrorist action in Russia on a large scale to destabilize the Bolsheviks and 
usher in a new era.44 Kutepov broke away and formed the Combat Organization. He 
poached the most daring and ruthless members from Wrangle’s outfit and trained them in 
clandestine operations and sabotage. 
Through the Trust the Cheka learned of Kutepov’s splinter group and his 
intentions to create havoc in Russia. To counter this group the Cheka developed a plan to 
establish bona fides with Kutepov and co-opt his Combat Organization with the Trust. 
This allowed the Cheka to stymie the terrorist efforts of the Combat Organization and 
also led to the capture of one of the Bolshevik’s staunchest rivals, the British spymaster 
Sydney Reilly. 
Kutepov had suspicions of the MOTSR from the beginning. To alleviate them he 
sent some of his most trusted agents to Russia to determine the authenticity of the 
movement. Maria and Radkovich Shults formed the core of this fact finding team. Trust 
members, who were actually Cheka officers, received the group and discussed the 
activities of the MOTSR. Yakushev even appointed Maria and her husband as members 
of his staff.45 This effectively hooked the couple, and Maria’s messages back to Kutepov 
were positive. The fictitious staff roles also served to delay the couple’s terrorist 
intentions. 
Maria not only communicated her findings of authenticity about the Trust to 
Kutepov but also to Sydney Reilly, who held a key role in a 1918 counter-revolutionary 
plot, and remained active within the anti-Bolshevik émigré community.46 Because of this 
the Cheka deemed him a significant threat that warranted targeting to be captured. 
Yakushev arranged for a meeting with Reilly in Helsinki. Accompanied by the Shults 
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couple, Yakushev convinced Reilly to come to Moscow in order to meet with members 
of the MOTSR Political Bureau. Reilly infiltrated into Russia through clandestine Trust 
corridors. He met with several Trust officials, who were undercover Cheka officers, to 
discuss topics such as funding and Western intelligence agency support to the anti-
Bolsheviks. The agents eventually detained Reilly. The Cheka then staged a fake 
shootout at a Trust border corridor and falsified Reilly’s death. Reilly was never seen 
again, and it is suspected that he revealed information that allowed the Bolsheviks to 
further penetrate British Intelligence.47 
d. Propagation of Disinformation 
To follow up the capture of Sydney Reilly and reestablish the Trust’s reputation, 
the Cheka devised an ingenious plan involving a respected émigré journalist named V.V. 
Shulgin.48 Shulgin was convinced to go to Russia to get a firsthand look at the Trust and 
the state of Russia under a supposed weakening Bolshevik regime. Shulgin was escorted 
by Maria Shults and her husband. The couple, who was unaware of the Cheka’s 
involvement, convinced him of the Trust’s authenticity and its role in ousting 
Bolshevisms. Shulgin agreed to write a book titled The Three Capitals: Travels in Red 
Russia, which presented his findings and chronicled his travels. Under the pretense of 
operational security, he sent a draft to Yakushev to edit, to ensure the Trust was not 
endangered by information in the book. This resulted in a work that strongly supported 
the Bolshevik disinformation theme that, “Bolshevism was vanishing, so there was no 
sense in fighting it; everything was as it was before, only somewhat worse; Russia was on 
the way to recovery and any kind of outside interference would only retard the trend.”49 
The Cheka effectively neutralized the threat posed by Kutepov’s Combat 
Organization and in the process further disseminated its disinformation theme to further 
dissuade other would be counter revolution threats. Sydney Reilly was permanently 
removed and the Shults couple was preoccupied with fake anti-Bolshevik activities, 
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spoon fed to them by the Cheka.50 Disinformation was propagated by Shulgin’s book The 
Three Capitals: Travels in Red Russia, which at the date of its publication had no 
perceived connection to the Bolsheviks.  
2. Analysis 
The Trust serves as an example of an organizational agent of influence. This case 
demonstrates that the employment of an organizational agent of influence is an indicator 
that the sponsor has a strategic planning capability. This case also demonstrates that 
individual and organizational agents of influence share the same core characteristics.  
a. Strategic Alignment of The Trust’s Actions with Bolshevik Goals 
The development of the Trust was a deliberate effort, conceived to help secure 
Bolshevik control of Soviet Russia by stifling latent counter-revolution threats. The 
Bolsheviks followed a deliberate strategy and incorporated emergent strategies to achieve 
a desired outcome. The overarching strategy employed by the Cheka required it to 
penetrate and control the MOTSR, and subvert the efforts of the anti-Bolshevik émigrés 
and the fledgling MOTSR. This strategy can be seen in two early instances. The first is 
when Lenin ordered Dzerzhinsky to neutralize the émigré threat. The second is when 
Dzerzhinsky initially reported on the MOTSR as a threat, only to be ordered by the 
Soviet Central Committee not to destroy it, but rather to penetrate and control it.51 This is 
important because it shows that a framework was set from the beginning that directed 
operations to collectively achieve a specific outcome. 
The events that followed the decision to penetrate and control the MOTSR 
evidence the strategic planning capability within the Cheka and Bolshevik party. The 
acquisition of Yakushev as an agent, the capture of Reilly, the subversion of the Combat 
Organization and the penning of The Three Capitals are all examples of opportunities 
born from the process of pursuing a deliberate strategy. When the Cheka first acquired 
Yakushev, it is fair to assume that they did not foresee the exact series of successful 
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operations that would follow. The fact that the organization consistently capitalized on 
these emergent opportunities further highlights its strategic planning capacity.  
The consistent disinformation theme that the Cheka disseminated through the 
Trust is another example of strategic planning. Convincing certain émigré groups to do 
nothing because change was at hand was nothing short of ingenious. In 1920, the 
Bolsheviks’ future of absolute rule was not secure. The country was recovering from 
WWI, and the Bolsheviks had narrowly put down a counter-revolutionary plot in 1918. 
Lenin did not possess the capability of addressing the latent émigré threat by attacking 
them on European soil, and he certainly did not have the ability to coerce European states 
to dispose of the émigrés for him. Through the Trust, the Bolsheviks developed a viable 
means of distributing believable disinformation to the correct audience, which influenced 
a large potential threat, the émigrés, to choose to never even become incipient.  
b. Clandestine Relationship 
The Cheka maintained a secret relationship with Alexander Yakushev and other 
MOTSR officers. This allowed the MOTSR, under Cheka control, to preserve its 
credibility as an anti-Bolshevik organization. By doing this the MOTSR maintained the 
bona fides required to interact with prominent émigrés. Without these clandestine or 
secret relationships the Trust could not have existed. 
The Cheka laid the groundwork for its clandestine relationship with Yakushev 
from the very beginning. The Cheka hid the fact that they interrogated Yakushev by 
arranging for him to go on a business trip and then creating the story that he fell ill with 
typhoid. By doing this, Yakushev’s disappearance never aroused suspicion among his 
MOTSR associates, allowing him to keep up the appearance of an anti-Bolshevik.  
c. Influence 
The Trust served most significantly as a platform for the Bolsheviks to convince 
émigré leaders not to take up arms against the Bolsheviks. The Cheka did this in two 
different ways. It directly employed Yakushev and other Cheka agents to interact with 
émigrés and spread the theme that Russia was on a natural path to return to its previous 
 22
condition; therefore, war was not necessary. The Cheka, through the Trust, also 
manipulated actual anti-Bolsheviks to spread this message. Maria and Radkovich Shults, 
who were true anti-Bolsheviks, served this purpose by sending reports back to Kutepov 
that reflected the Bolshevik theme. The Cheka even managed to indirectly convince V.V. 
Shulgin, the respected émigré journalist, to write a book which streamed the Bolshevik 
theme to his fellow émigrés. 
C. CONCLUSION 
An agent of influence can be an individual or an entire organization. Pierre-
Charles Pathé is an example of an individual acting as an agent of influence. The Trust 
shows an organization acting as an agent of influence. Both cases demonstrate that the 
agent of influences’ actions are aligned with the subversive actors’ strategic goals, a 
clandestine relationship exists between the sponsors and the agents, and that the agent 
influences a population for the benefit of the sponsor. The employment of an agent of 
influence by an organization indicates that the organization has a strategic planning 
capability. Use of agents of influence requires a strategy with objectives and an ability to 




III. HAMAS EMPLOYMENT OF THE HOLY LAND 
FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT AS AN AGENT 
OF INFLUENCE 
Because to influence a person is to give him one’s own soul. He does not 
think his natural thoughts, or burn with his natural passions. His virtues 
are not real to him. His sins, if there are such things as sins, are borrowed. 
He becomes an echo of someone else’s music, an actor of a part that has 
not been written for him. 
—Oscar Wilde, Picture of Dorian Gray52 
 
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), a former U.S.-
based charity, acted as an agent of influence for Hamas. The connection between Hamas 
and the HLF is already established by the court case U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief and Development, et al., which resulted in the conviction of several top HLF 
officials for providing material support to Hamas. The court also cited HLF as a front for 
Hamas.53 This chapter goes one step further and argues that the HLF acted not only as a 
Hamas front organization but also as an agent of influence, employed to garner support 
for Hamas. This argument is justified by 1) the fact that Hamas leadership played a direct 
role in creating and guiding the HLF, 2) the deliberate concealment of the direct 
connection between Hamas and the HLF, 3) the use of events by the HLF to influence 
people to support Hamas’ objectives and 4) the way HLF activities were aligned with an 
established Hamas strategy. 
A. BACKGROUND: THE HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
To understand how Hamas employed the Holy Land Foundation as an agent of 
influence in the United States, it is necessary to understand Hamas’ roots with the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, and the use of Dawah to further Hamas objectives. Hamas was 
founded as an offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, and it remains strongly 
influenced by its ideology. The influence is seen in the connections that key Hamas 
leaders have or had with the Muslim Brotherhood and in Hamas’ use of Dawah to further 
its goals.  
1. Sheik Yassin Cofounder of Hamas 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin cofounded Hamas and was responsible for establishing its 
system of Dawah. Dawah is a Hamas wing of social services that penetrates down to the 
neighborhood level, and provides Hamas with a foothold in Palestinian society. Yassin 
was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and, as early as 1983, four years before 
Hamas was officially established, he organized and directed militant operations.54 In 
1987 Hamas was officially established and at this point Sheik Yassin assumed control of 
the Dawah networks. He maintained a close connection with militant and political Hamas 
activities and supported them through use of the Dawah networks until his assassination 
in 2004. In an interview with author Chehab Zaki, Sheik Yassin explained that Hamas 
had a four-phased strategy. “The first phase was to build institutions; the charities and 
social services.”55 The second phase focused on building popularity amongst the 
populations of the West Bank and Gaza and establishing its political credibility.56 The 
third phase focused on developing Hamas’ military capabilities.57 The forth phase 
focused on “moving beyond the Palestinian dimension and establish[ing] a dialogue with 
its Arab and Islamic neighbors.”58 
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2. Mousa Abu Marzook  
Mousa Abu Marzook is another prominent Hamas leader with direct ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In 1976, he was a prominent Muslim Brotherhood activist in Abu 
Dhabi.59 In 1982 he moved to Louisiana to pursue his doctorate in engineering, and there 
he assumed a critical role in establishing three charity organizations in the United States, 
all of which played roles in supporting Hamas: (1) Islamic Association of Palestine, (2) 
The United Association for Studies and Research, and (3) The Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief and Development.60 Marzook assumed control of Hamas in 1989 and ran it from 
his residence in Virginia, after Israeli authorities arrested Sheik Yassin. He also exerted 
control over the Hamas front organizations that he previously established. FBI 
surveillance observed Marzook exerting this control during a Hamas meeting that took 
place in Mississippi in 1994. Surveillance overheard Marzook directing the attendees that 
the primary fund-raising entity for Hamas in the United States would be the Holy Land 
Foundation.61 
Sheik Yassin and Marzook both used Dawah to further Hamas objectives. Yassin 
did this in the occupied territories by establishing networks to provide social services to 
Palestinians. According to Mathew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Dawah supports Hamas by radicalizing populations 
through its social programs, while its activities garner support from the population for 
Hamas.62 Marzook sought to accomplish this in the United States by establishing 
charities and foundations as fronts to support Hamas.  
                                                 
59 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale 
Press, 2006), 40. 
60 Ibid. 
61 David E. Henifin, “What Took So Long? Closing the Holy Land Foundation: A Case Study in 
Counterterrorism,” Homeland Security Digital Library, 2, last modified 2004, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457675. 
62 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 6. 
 26
3. Rise and Fall of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development 
Abu Marzook and his wife’s family played a central role in establishing the Holy 
Land Foundation as a non-profit charity in the United States. This connection is 
documented by HLF tax records, which show multiple money transactions, going both 
ways, between Marzook and the HLF.63 HLF was first established in 1989 in California, 
under the name “Occupied Land Fund.” In 1992 the HLF moved to Richardson Texas. 
For a decade the HLF participated in events throughout the United States to garner 
support and raise funds for Hamas.  
HLF-sponsored and -affiliated events usually occurred in the form of conferences. 
The conferences featured Islamic scholars, bands and even persons fresh from the 
frontlines of Gaza. At the events HLF and similar Hamas supporting charities maintained 
booths and distributed publications all aimed at supporting Hamas’ position. Tax returns 
showed that its revenue in 2000 exceeded $13 million, making it one of the largest and 
most successful Islamic charities in the US.64 The U.S. government believes that the 
majority of the HLF’s revenues were used to support Hamas.65 
On December 4, 2001, the HLF was designated a material supporter to Hamas, a 
terrorist organization.66 This essentially marked the end of HLF. The trials, retrials and 
appeals lasted for eight years eventually resulting in five HLF senior leaders being found 
guilty of conspiring to support a terrorist organization, and receiving sentences ranging 
from 10 to 65 years in prison.67  
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The Holy Land Foundation acted as an agent of influence for Hamas. Through the 
HLF Hamas targeted sympathetic populations to garner support. To do this the HLF 
deliberately concealed its relationship with Hamas, which allowed it to operate with less 
scrutiny. Most significantly, the HLF’s activities aligned with Hamas strategy to help 
achieve Hamas aims.  
1. HLF Influence Operations to Support Hamas 
The HLF is one of several fronts that raised funds for Hamas. The HLF worked 
closely with the United Association for Studies and Research and the Islamic Association 
of Palestinians to organize events with the purpose of garnering support for Hamas. As 
these organizations grew they became folded under another organization called the 
Palestinian Committee, established by the Muslim Brotherhood to manage Hamas fronts 
based in the United States.68 This is detailed in an excerpt from the following 1992 
Muslim Brotherhood memo titled “Islamic Action for the Palestinian Cause in North 
America” (the HLF is referred to as the Occupied Land Fund): 
[w]hen . . . the Intifada started and the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hamas) was formed and the general apparatus for Palestine developed . . . 
a ‘Palestine Committee’ was formed under the supervision of the 
executive office [of the Muslim Brotherhood]. The Committee was then 
tasked with supervising all the organizations which serve the plan of the 
Movement domestically and internationally in addition to the Palestinian 
cause. Among these organizations were the ‘Islamic Association’ [the 
IAP], the ‘Occupied Land Fund,’ and the ‘United Association’ [the 
UASR]. Like other directors of the Movement’s committees and sections, 
the director of Palestine Committee is to submit periodical reports and 
adheres to the directions and the guidance of the leadership of the 
Group.69 
These front organizations held a series of successful fundraisers across the United 
States. The effects of their efforts can be seen in a memo from the Palestinian Committee 
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reporting on the 1989–1990 year end accomplishments. The following is an excerpt from 
this memo: 
Twenty-three Intifada festivals have been held this year . . . Al Sakhra 
band participated in over 25 festivals during activities of the Association 
and the Fund [HLF] . . . The sum of $728,059.04 has been raised through 
the Occupied Land Fund to support the steadfastness of the people in the 
Inside. Most of the money has been transferred . . . Five books have been 
issued by the United Association for Studies & Research. They are 
currently being marketed to benefit the Intifada . . . The Studies office 
[UASR] has published 5 issues of Al Aqsa bulletins and 6 issues of the 
Striking Arms leaflets.70 
The name of the band Al Sakhra, meaning The Rock, is a reference to the Dome 
of the Rock. The Dome of the Rock, located in Jerusalem, is an Islamic shrine, built in 
691 over the top of a Roman Temple. The site is recognized by both Jews and Muslims as 
the location where Abraham attempted to sacrifice his son. The Crusaders captured the 
site in 1099; Saladin recaptured the site in 1187. The Dome has remained under Muslim 
control ever since. Because of this history the Rock of the Dome is very symbolic to 
Palestinians. The lead singer of the band is Mufid Abdulqader, the half-brother of 
Hamas’ current leader Khaled Meshal.71 The band had reputation for its anti-Israeli lyrics 
and calls for acts of violence against Israel. The band played at events to excite audiences 
and drive up donations.  
The annual Islamic Conference, held in Kansas City, is one of the Intifada 
festivals referred in the Palestinian Committee memo. According to Nasser Hidmi, who 
was arrested in Israel in the early 1990s for attempting to detonate a bomb, Hamas used 
these conferences to recruit future Hamas operatives. Nasser claims that as a member of a 
Hamas wing, he actively recruited at the Islamic Conference.72 He described one such 
incident to Israeli authorities in the following statement:  
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At the Islamic Conference there were five thousand invited guests that 
stayed at hotels surrounding the center.… At the conference at Kansas 
City [in 1989], Muhammad Salah [a.k.a. Abu Ahmed] gathered about 
twenty young men including myself, for a secret meeting of the activists 
of Hamas in a meeting hall at one of the hotels. At this meeting, 
Muhammad Salah and Ibrahim Al-Muzain [an officer of the Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), another United States-
based charity that provides funding for Hamas within Israel] lectured to 
us. They informed us that all the young men that were present and were 
chosen for the secret meetings were from the Occupied Territories and 
were selected according to forms they filled out in the [refugee] camps. 
This was done in order that they will take part in activities that will 
support and strengthen the Intifada within the framework of Hamas.73  
The involvement of Al-Muzain, an HLF board member, with the direct 
recruitment of future Hamas militants during an HLF sponsored event shows that the 
HLF was used as a recruitment platform for Hamas. 
2. Hamas and HLF Maintained a Clandestine Relationship 
Hamas and HLF maintained a clandestine relationship to avoid legal 
consequences from the United States government. The most concrete evidence of this 
comes from an infamous meeting dubbed the “Philly meeting.” Held in 1993, Abu Baker, 
the CEO of HLF, presided over the meeting. He held the meeting to determine how the 
U.S. based fronts would continue to support Hamas and how they could assist in derailing 
Palestinian Authority peace negotiations with Israel. 
Abu Baker established a cover for the true nature of the Philly meeting to disguise 
it as a workshop between the IAP and HLF. He also instructed attendees that if 
questioned about the meetings nature to use the workshop cover story. He directed 
attendees to refer to Hamas during the meeting only as “sister Samah.”74 Samah is 
Hamas spelled backwards. During the meeting Abu Baker also described the necessity of 
concealing HLF’s support to Hamas, and the need for a narrative that would be 
acceptable for domestic U.S. consumption. He explained that being upfront about 
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opposing Arafat and peace negotiations with Israel would put them at risk of being 
labeled terrorists:75 
[W]e don’t want the American front to become a front for direct conflict. 
These things will put us in direct conflict, not only with the Palestinians, 
even with the official government circles. What is our benefit, what is our 
interest? As Palestinian action organizations in America, what is our 
benefit in creating more enemies than necessary?76 
Abu Baker also explained that they must “behave as an American organization” 
by taking care of a diverse population, and not appear to support only a specific 
group. He then goes on to say that they can do this by giving $100,000 to the 
Islamists and $5,000 to the other groups.77 When Marzook refers to Islamists he 
means Hamas. Essentially he explained how to hide HLF’s support to Hamas by 
creating a smoke screen of contributions to other groups. 
3. HLF’s Alignment with Hamas Strategy 
The Philly meeting also shows how the activities of the HLF were aligned to 
execute Hamas’ strategy “to move beyond the Palestinian dimension.” Hamas initially 
accomplished this by branding the Palestinian struggle as an Islamic struggle and then 
called on neighboring Muslim states for support. To accomplish this in the United States 
Hamas relied on its front organizations to garner support from U.S. populations. During 
the Philly conference the attendees formulated a plan to present Hamas’ Ideology to the 
American people, by presenting it as a Palestinian concern, not a Hamas goal. The 
attendees believed that by avoiding a connection with Hamas, their sponsoring 
organization, they would be in a better position to influence a U.S. audience. The group 
devised a plan to bring Islamic scholars to the United States to discuss the Palestinian 
situation. The conference would then end with all the scholars backing a position that is 
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similar to Hamas’ and declare a fatwah to oppose the peace negotiations.78 The group 
also discussed how the scholars would be secretly leveraged by Hamas’ leadership to 
execute this plan. Publicly the attendance of the Scholars would be seen as the result of 
an invitation from U.S. based Islamic charities. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The HLF acted as a Hamas agent of Influence with the purpose of furthering 
Hamas’ goals. Hamas leaders established HLF and maintained a clandestine relationship 
with it to avoid scrutiny. HLF leadership and the leadership of affiliated organizations 
were very deliberate about this as evidenced by discussions at the “Philly” conference. 
The HLF conducted activities in the United States to influence people to support Hamas’ 
ideology and closely coordinated to support Hamas strategy. One example of this was 
exposed by FBI wiretaps, showing HLF’s CEO conspiring to sponsor an event to 
discredit Palestinian and Israeli negotiations in order to support Hamas’ position. Over 
the course of a decade the HLF operated freely and successfully as a Hamas agent of 
influence.  
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IV. AL-QAEDA EMPLOYMENT OF THE AL-KIFAH REFUGEE 
CENTER AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE 
“Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!” 
―The Wizard of Oz (1939)79 
The Al-Kifah (The Struggle) Refugee Center, under the control of Sheik Omar 
Abdel Rahman, acted as an agent of influence for Al-Qaeda. This chapter demonstrates 
that Rahman 1) aligned the direction of Al-Kifah to support Al-Qaeda’s vision, 2) 
maintained a clandestine relationship with Al-Qaeda, and 3) influenced a target audience 
on behalf of Al-Qaeda trough Al-Kifah. 
A. BACKGROUND OF AL-KIFAH REFUGEE CENTER 
The history of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center is steeped in terror plots, murder, and 
scandal. In retrospect it may seem surprising that some of the events occurred or were 
even allowed to occur. When reviewing the background of Al-Kifah, and some of its 
affiliates, it must be kept in mind that during the 1980s and early 1990s the jihad effects 
of the Arab mujahedeen were not seen as a threat to the United States. These 
predecessors to Al-Qaeda were seen as freedom fighters and even allies to the United 
States, fighting against Soviet communist incursion.  
1. Established by Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden 
In 1984 Abdullah Azzam, a highly respected mujahedeen figure who played a 
central role in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, developed an international support network 
called the Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahidin (MAK) “Office of Services for the 
Mujahedeen.” The network provided funds and recruits for the Afghan mujahidin. Osama 
Bin Laden bolstered this network by providing direct funding. The MAK operated out of 
several countries to include the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden 
and several Middle Eastern countries. In the United States Azzam and Bin Laden opened 
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offices and affiliates of the MAK in over 30 cities.80 In the United States MAK offices 
went by the name Al-Kifah; the flag ship office operated out of Brooklyn New York. 
Mustafa al-Shalabi, appointed by Azzam, presided over all the Al-Kifah from the 
Brooklyn office. 
Initially, Al-Kifah operated from an unassuming desk located in the al Faruq 
mosque, until it moved to a small apartment down the street. Despite its modest 
appearance, the Brooklyn Al-Kifah office acted as a hub for the greater MAK network 
and provided Assam’s mujahedeen efforts with direct access to new recruits and funds.81 
The block on which Al-Kifah stood, between Third and Fourth Avenues on Atlantic 
Avenue, served as an initial stopping point for Middle Eastern and African immigrants. 
The Islamic bookstores and Arab restaurants, which teamed with notices that advertised 
in Arabic for jobs and apartments, drew the immigrants. The Al-Kifah Refugee Center, 
located in the center of this bustle, provided a conduit for volunteers to participate in the 
Soviet Afghan War. It became known to volunteers as the “service for Jihad” office.82  
Al-Kifah’s identity as a proponent of Afghan jihad stemmed not only from its 
actions but also from its affiliation with its founder Abdullah Azzam. This can be seen 
from a flyer distributed by Al-Kifah, which on its letter head states, ““al-Kifah Refugee 
Center is an organization founded by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam to serve the cause of 
jihad.”83 Abdullah Azzam served as the catalyzing force that held together the Arab 
mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan, which he coined as the “Afghan Arabs.” Azzam 
derived his credibility from his status as an Islamic scholar and authority. In 1973 he 
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received a PHD in the Roots of Islamic Law from the Al-Ahzar University in Cairo.84 
This coupled with his success and exploits in Afghanistan gave Azzam significant bona 
fides amongst devout Muslims and in turn bolstered Al-Kifah’s credibility. This 
credibility would later be coveted by Bin Laden. 
2. Fractures Among the Afghan Arabs 
In late 1988, the Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan triggered a breakdown in unity 
among the Afghan Arabs. This breakdown soon led to conflict, the lines of which were 
largely defined by future visions for the jihad and by nationalities. Azzam’s purpose for 
developing the Arab mujahedeen in Afghanistan stemmed from his identity as a 
Palestinian, and served a greater goal of defeating Israel. Azzam believed that war with 
the Soviets in Afghanistan served as a training ground for young Palestinians, to hone 
their capabilities and religious will to eventually fight against Israel.85 Azzam believed 
victory against the Soviets to be the most pressing fight for Muslims, because the “war in 
Afghanistan was intended to bring forth an Islamic State.”86 The Egyptians, such as 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, had a different vision for the mujahedeen. They wanted to harness 
the existing infrastructure to defeat the Egyptian government, which they believed to be 
corrupt. Bin Laden’s vision differed drastically from Azzam’s and that of the Egyptian’s. 
He did not wish to continue the jihad against Muslim entities such as the Egyptian 
government or in Israel where he could find himself in conflict with Muslin “secularist” 
Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. This marked the nascent 
stages of Bin Laden’s strategy to target Western governments, which he later termed the 
“Far” enemy. Bin Laden believed that support from these governments was responsible 
for the continued reign of corrupt Muslim governments. During this period Bin Laden 
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began consolidating power. He brought together a small group of Afghan Arabs to form 
the initial core of Al-Qaeda.87 
The conflict amongst the Afghan Arabs came to a head on November 24, 1989, in 
Peshawar, Pakistan when Abdullah Azzam’s vehicle hit a roadside bomb, killing him and 
his two sons. Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri are strongly suspected to have been 
behind Azzam’s assassination.88 Osama Bin Laden then assumed control of the MAK 
and supplanted it with his newly formed Al-Qaeda. 
3. The Effects of Bin Laden’s Takeover of the MAK are Felt in the 
United States 
The United States-based Al-Kifah offices soon felt the effects of leadership 
change in Afghanistan, ushered in by Sheikh Omar Adel Rahman, also called the Blind 
Sheikh, who moved from Egypt to Brooklyn in July of 1990. Rahman was a highly 
respected Islamic scholar with a large following of devout Muslims, drawn to his 
notoriety as an influencer behind the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. Rahman, 
whose expenses were underwritten by Bin Laden, quickly assumed a position speaking at 
the Al-Farooq mosque and established himself as an authority within Al-Kifah.89 Abdel 
al-Rahman Haggag, the Sheik’s speechwriter who became a government informant, 
stated that Bin Laden routinely funneled $5,000 to Rahman, through a middleman named 
Abdul Rahman Alamoudi.90 Mustafa Shalabi, Azzam’s appointee, and Rahman quickly 
became rivals. They disagreed about Al-Kifah’s role in supporting jihad. Shalabi 
remained loyal to Azzam’s vision and insisted on supporting jihad in Afghanistan. 
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Rahman wanted to leverage the office to export jihad to other countries. Shalabi sensed 
that his life was in danger and made arrangements to flee to Egypt. On February 25, 
1991, one day before his scheduled departure, a gunman shot and killed him at his 
residence. Investigators never identified the gunman, but it is widely believed to be 
Mahmud Abouhalima, who acted at the behest of Sheikh Rahman.91 This effectively 
ended Azzam’s remaining influence over Al-Kifah, but the credibility Azzam built over 
the years amongst Muslims remained with it.  
The direction of Al-Kifah quickly changed, and it became aligned with Al-Qaeda. 
The organization no longer focused just on Afghanistan. The scope of the office 
expanded to support and advocate for jihad in other countries. This new focus can be seen 
in a February 1993 publication of Al-Hussam (The Sword,) a biweekly newsletter 
produced by Al-Kifah. The first two pages of the three page publication are of an article 
titled “The Obligation to Fight the Infidels.” This article provides a long and twisting 
argument to compel readers to actively seek out jihad. The third page of the publication is 
titled “News” and provides details of wrongful acts against Muslims in other countries. 
The publication, using the credibility built by Azzam, is a one stop advertisement for 
jihad; it provides not only the motivation but specific locations to take action.  
On February 26, 1993, a group of terrorists led by Ramzi Yousef attacked the 
World Trade Center. Strikingly, Ramzi Yousef is the nephew of Khalid Sheik Mohamed, 
who would later be convicted of masterminding the 9/11 attacks. The Al-Kifah Refugee 
Center quickly became the subject of a federal investigation due to the fact that several of 
the bombing suspects were affiliated with the center. Authorities suspected that Sheikh 
Rahman acted as a spiritual guide for the attackers but brought no official charges against 
him. Ramzi Yousef escaped to Pakistan where he stayed in a guest house funded by Bin 
Laden.92 Pakistani authorities eventual captured him in 1995. Several other scandals 
plagued the organization. In November of 1990, in Manhattan, El Sayyid A. Nosair, 
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another center affiliate, murdered Israeli politician Rabbi Meir Kahane. Investigators later 
found that Bin Laden paid for Nosair’s defense.93 In June of 1993 the FBI arrested Sheik 
Rahman for his involvement with the New York City landmark bomb plot. The FBI 
foiled a plot to target six prominent locations in New York City as a follow-up to the 
1993 World Trade Center Bombing. Sheikh Rahman is currently serving a life sentence 
in U.S. federal prison for his involvement. 
4. Al-Kifah Is Rebranded 
Due to increased scrutiny by the U.S. government Al-Kifah authority shifted from 
the Brooklyn office to an office in Boston. The production of Al-Hussam also moved to 
the Boston office. The Boston Al-Kifah office eventually rebranded itself as CARE 
International, a charity with tax exempt status. Despite the efforts of CARE International 
leadership to distance itself from Al-Kifah, Al-Qaeda and Sheikh Rahman, the U.S. 
government indicted CARE and several board members, some of the charges were 
related to conspiracy to cover its links to terrorism.94 Three board members of CARE 
International were convicted of fraud and purposefully hiding its connection to Al-Kifah. 
Central to the prosecutions argument was CARE International’s publication of Al-
Hussam, which remained identical to its publication under Al-Kifah.95 
B. ANALYSIS 
Analysis of Al-Kifah and the actions of Sheik Rahman show that the Al-Kifah 
Refugee Center acted as an Al-Qaeda agent of influence. Sheik Rahman acted through 
and employed Al-Kifah in line with Al-Qaeda strategy. He also concealed his and the 
Center’s ties to Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, Sheik Rahman streamed messages through Al-
Kifah and used Al-Kifah’s credibility to influence a target population. 
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Al-Kifah Refugee Center became aligned with Al-Qaeda’s vision when Sheikh 
Rahman assumed control of the organization. This re-alignment is marked by the murder 
of Shalabi and evident in Al-Kifah’s publication Al-Hussam, Sheikh Rahman’s rhetoric, 
and by the terrorist actions under taken by affiliates of the Center. These aspects show a 
change in focus from Abdullah Azzam’s original intent for Al-Kifah, to support jihad in 
Afghanistan, to attacking foreign governments or the “far enemy.” 
The murder of Shalabi is very important because it coincides with the 
assassination of Abdullah Azzam. Both acts opened the door for Osama Bin Laden to 
spread Al-Qaeda’s influence. The split between Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam 
is credited to staunch differences in opinion about the future of the jihad. Azzam proved 
to be a direct obstacle to Bin Laden’s desire to mobilize the existing jihad infrastructure, 
MAK, and the Afghan Arabs, in his direction. There is no hard evidence that proves Bin 
Laden orchestrated Azzam’s assassination, but it is undeniable that he benefited from it 
by assuming control of MAK and bringing the rest of the Afghan Arabs under his control. 
This plays out very similarly to the murder of Mustafa Shalabi in Brooklyn, New York. 
Shalabi remained loyal to Azzam’s vision for the organization, and this presented an 
obstacle to Sheikh Rahman’s plans. Sheikh Rahman wanted to leverage the organization 
to participate in jihad beyond Afghanistan, specifically Western targets. This is evidenced 
by his involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing and the Land Marks terror 
plot. By removing Shalabi, Sheikh Rahman positioned himself to assume control of Al-
Kifah and realign its direction with that of Al-Qaeda’s. 
The propaganda distributed by Al-Kifah and Sheikh Rahman while the center 
operated under his control shows alignment with Al-Qaeda strategy. The 5 February, 
1993, publication of Al-Hussam shows the AL-Kifah center’s focus on spreading jihad to 
areas outside of Afghanistan, specifically areas where Muslims are in direct conflict with 
non-Muslims.  
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Rahman’s rhetoric, according to U.S. court documents, insisted that all Muslims 
must participate in violent jihad against the enemies of Islam and identifies the United 
States as one of those enemies: 
Rahman, a blind Islamic scholar and cleric, was the leader of the seditious 
conspiracy, the purpose of which was “jihad,” in the sense of a struggle 
against the enemies of Islam. Indicative of this purpose, in a speech to his 
followers Rahman instructed that they were to “do jihad with the sword, 
with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile . . . against God’s 
enemies.”96 
In January 1993, Rahman appeared at a conference in Brooklyn, and voiced his 
beliefs in violent jihad. He further stated that being called “terrorists was fine, so long as 
they were terrorizing the enemies of Islam, the foremost of which was the United States 
and its allies.”  
2. Clandestine Relationship 
The evidence of a secret relationship between Sheikh Rahman and Al-Qaeda is 
rooted in the fact that Bin Laden paid for Rahman’s living expenses and is reinforced by 
a series of relationships that connect Sheikh Rahman and Al-Kifah to Bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda. Because Al-Qaeda is a network there is not always a clear trail of orders being 
given and followed. Rather, there is evidence of approval. In Bin Laden’s case this 
approval is shown through funding.97 The fact that he funded Sheik Rahman shows that 
he supported Rahman’s actions. Another connection is El Sayyid A. Nosair, the Al-Kifah 
affiliate that murdered Rabbi Meir Kahane. Nosair acted with the approval of Sheikh 
Rahman and later Bin Laden contributed to Nosair’s defense which further shows the 
connection between Rahman and Bin Laden.  
Sheik Rahman concealed his relationship with Al-Qaeda by using a middle man 
to receive funds from Bin Laden. This establishes a hidden or clandestine relationship 
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between Bin Laden and Sheikh Rahman. Furthermore, he has publicly denied any 
affiliation with Al-Qaeda. 
3. Influence  
Rahman and Al-Kifah combined together created a significant influential force. 
The Al-Kifah center had an enormous amount of credibility with militant Muslims, which 
attracted individuals who were keen on action. Sheik Rahman’s status as a premier 
Islamic scholar made his statements close to infallible amongst some groups. Together 
they made for a dangerous concoction that influenced individuals to commit acts of 
violence against the United States. 
Al-Kifah provided a venue with credibility amongst Muslims and a degree of 
deference from authorities, making it well suited to recruit and employ terrorists. The 
local Muslim community referred to Al-Kifah as the jihad-center; this shows that the 
center garnered a reputation for action. This is not unfounded; some estimates credit Al-
Kifah with sending up to 200 individuals to Afghanistan over the course of two years.98 
The Al-Kifah office proved a prime stop for individuals seeking to fulfill what they saw 
as an obligation to participate in jihad. The office operated for approximately two years 
under the guidance of Abdullah Azzam; it focused on supporting the mujahedeen in the 
Soviet-Afghan war. In general the United States government, most Americans and most 
Muslims considered this a good thing. Because of this the recruiting, fund raising and 
propaganda efforts conducted from the Al-Kifah office did not raise suspicion. The center 
acted as a functioning piece of infrastructure, from which terrorist actions were applied in 
support of Al-Qaeda ideology. 
While Al-Kifah provided the infrastructure to attract and employ jihadist, Sheik 
Rahman provided the direction and justification. The influence Sheikh Rahman wielded 
must not be understated. As an Islamic scholar from a premier institution, his fatwas were 
heard and acted upon emphatically. This is evidenced by the 1981 assassination of 
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Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, where the assassins acted at the behest of the Sheikh’s 
Fatwas.99 Although he was not convicted for his involvement, it is believed that his 
words played a part in influencing, and justifying the actions of the assassins. During his 
reign at Al-Kifah Sheikh Rahman provided similar influence and justification for the 
1993 World Trade Center bombers. He acted as their spiritual guide, assuring them that 
their actions were founded in Islamic law. Sheik Rahman defined his role as an influencer 
in response to a question from a reporter, “My work is not to gather people or send 
volunteers. My work is not to collect money. My work is to call on people to collect 
money for the mujahedeen and to go over there for jihad. And I don’t belong to any 
party.”100  
C. CONCLUSION 
The Al-Kifah Refugee Center, under Sheikh Rahman’s control acted as an agent 
of influence for Al-Qaeda. Al-Kifah’s shift in focus from supporting jihad efforts in 
Afghanistan to expanding its scope to target other governments, especially non-Muslim 
governments, is in line with the MAK strategy shift implemented by Bin Laden. This 
shows that Al-Kifah supported Al-Qaeda strategy. The connection between Sheikh 
Rahman and Al-Kifah to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda was deliberately concealed. They 
implemented a scheme using a middle man to pass funds and avoid detection. This is 
evidence of a clandestine relationship. Sheikh Rahman, through Al-Kifah influenced a 
population to act in line with Al-Qaeda. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 
Land Marks plot and printing of Al-Hussam are all evidence of this. Through Sheikh 
Rahman and the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, Osama Bin Laden successfully spread Al-
Qaeda ideology to an audience in the United States and influenced individuals to commit 
acts of violence against the United States to further Al-Qaeda objectives. 
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This thesis demonstrates that non-state network-based actors can indeed possess a 
strategic planning capacity. This is proven by showing two instances where networks 
employed agents of influence, an act that requires a strategic planning capability. In both 
of these instances the network-based actors employed agents of influence that showed 
similar characteristics those employed by states. 
A. FINDINGS 
For an organization or an individual to be considered an agent of influence they 
must be aligned strategically with a sponsor, engage in a clandestine or secret relationship 
with the sponsor, and possess the ability to influence an audience. The strategic 
alignment of the agent with the sponsor is critical. Without this alignment the actions of 
the agent of influence are not likely to benefit the sponsor and may even be damaging. 
The clandestine relationship protects the agent of influence’s credibility with the target 
population and hides the hand of the sponsor.  
Hamas effectively employed the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development (HLF) as an organizational agent of influence. This case showed that the 
HLF’s efforts fell in line with Hamas’ strategic goals, that a clandestine relationship 
between Hamas and the HLF existed, and that the HLF conducted influence activities on 
behalf of Hamas. The HLF successfully staged events to raise funds, recruit operatives 
and influence attendees to embrace Hamas’ position, which was and still is the re-
establishment of old Palestine without negotiating with Israel.  
Al-Qaeda infiltrated Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman into the Al-Kifah Refugee 
Center, resulting in Al-Kifah becoming an organizational agent of influence for Al-
Qaeda. Due to Sheikh Rahman’s actions Al-Kifah became aligned with Al-Qaeda’s 
ideology. Sheikh Rahman then used Al-Kifah as a platform to spread Al-Qaeda ideology, 
resulting in assassinations, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and plans to attack 
U.S. infrastructure.  
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B. AREAS OF FURTHER INTEREST 
While researching agents of influence and networks it became very apparent how 
vulnerable the United States is to agents of influence and how difficult it is to determine 
which networks have a strategic planning capacity. This presents two broad areas for 
future research to answer: 1) How can the U.S. detect and safeguard against agents of 
influence; and 2) What characteristics are required for a network to have strategic 
planning capability? Safeguarding against agents of influence is relevant because it 
directly addresses a larger topic of how to prevent foreign actors from fomenting dissent 
within the U.S. population. Identifying which characteristics are required for a network to 
have a strategic planning capacity is relevant because it can lead to new ways to identify 
which networks pose the greatest potential threat.  
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